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A U T H O R

Erin E. Troland

H

ow can developing countries build strong
governments and dynamic economies to improve the lives of their people?  As a Foreign
Language and International Economics major, I became
intrigued by this question throughout my undergraduate
studies.  The focus of my research project, Fair Trade
coffee, was especially interesting to me as a tool for
economic development.  Fair Trade represents a nongovernmental attempt to address the effects of a volatile
coffee market on farmers in developing countries.  Through my research,
I gained a lot of experience doing statistical analysis and came up with a
few surprising results.  I look forward to pursuing my interests further in
graduate study, followed by a career in academic research.

What Is Brewing
in Your Latté? –
An Economic
Analysis of the
Fair Trade Coffee
Movement
Introduction
In late December of 2003, Ethiopian coffee farmer
Hayder Hassan found himself in a grim situation:
“Three years ago you could get twice
as much for a kilo of coffee as you do
today…We have no factories or any other
means to live here. We dream of a better
price for coffee, but only the government or
God can assist us.” (Oxfam America)

Faculty Mentor:
Christopher Bollinger, Department of Economics
Gatton College of Business & Economics
Increased social awareness of worldwide poverty has led to a number of
interesting programs designed to aid development without simply giving
money.  One such program is the Fair Trade Coffee movement, which pays
higher than market prices to farmers who grow coffee meeting certain
agriculture and labor standards.  This program can be viewed as a simple
price floor, but is unusual in that it is an agent operating in the market
rather than a government entity guaranteeing the price.  This type of market
intervention has not been well studied.  Erin Troland noted that classic price
floor theory would suggest that ultimately the Fair Trade movement could
have the impact of lowering average prices in the market rather than raising
them, because farmers would be induced to produce higher output.  However,
she also noted this impact depended upon many factors.  Other models can
suggest either higher prices or simply no change in prices.  Erin collected
extensive production and price data at the country level for a period of up
to sixteen years.  She then estimated models for the price and quantity of
coffee.  One concern, given that participation in Fair Trade is optional, is
that countries with historically low coffee prices (relative to the world price)
would be most likely to participate.   Erin used a number of approaches,
including fixed effects estimation, to control for this issue.   Her research
finds that indeed the Fair Trade movement has the unanticipated effect of
reducing coffee prices by at least 10% in countries with participating growers,
and increasing production by as much as 20%.  Her results demand further
investigation and are a fruitful area for further research.  The paper is well
written and professionally done.

Beginning in the late nineties, coffee prices
on the world market began to plummet to record
lows. In 2002, the International Coffee Organization
(ICO) published a report stating that world market
prices were at a 100-year low in real terms and
called the situation a “global coffee crisis.” The ICO
attributed the crisis to vast overproduction fueled
by the rapid rise of coffee production in Vietnam
and Indonesia.
Coffee is one of the world’s most valuable
traded commodities, providing the livelihood for an
estimated 125 million people worldwide (Osorio, 2).
In other words, a version of Mr. Hassan’s story could
be repeated 125 million times over. Moreover, coffee
accounts for a very large share of total exports in
some of the world’s poorest countries. In Burundi,
Rwanda, Uganda, and Mr. Hassan’s Ethiopia, coffee
accounts for least one fifth of total exports (International Trade Center). All four African nations have a
calculated per capita Gross National Income (GNI)
of $300 or less (World Development Indicators
2006). Clearly, “a ‘coffee crisis’ is therefore a crisis
of development” (Ronchi, 2).
The coffee market is currently in the process
of recovering from the crisis. Prices have begun to
climb over the past few years. However, the effects
of the coffee crisis are still being felt around the
world. As Mr. Hassan dreamed of a better price
for his coffee, governments and aid organizations
around the world proposed various programs to
alleviate poverty caused by the crisis. One such
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program began to gain popularity as the crisis continued,
though it had existed in some form for several decades.
As coffee farmers saw coffee prices reach record lows,
the demand for certain types of coffee bearing the label
“Fairtrade Certified” began to take off. Each bag of such
coffee, though typically more expensive than most, carried the prospect of poverty alleviation in countries hit
by the coffee crisis.  
The theory behind the Fair Trade movement is that
certain market failures, such as lack of market power
and asymmetry of information, decrease the return to
farmers and increase their vulnerability to volatility in the
market (Ronchi, 1). Logistically, the program involves the
cooperation of four parties: the producers, the fair trade
organization, the distributors, and consumers. Producers promise to uphold certain environmental and labor
standards set by the Fair Trade organization in exchange
for the right to call their product “fair trade certified.”
The fair trade organization sets a minimum price
(above that of the market) at which distributors may
purchase the fair trade products. Distributors buy these
certified products at the above-market fair trade price in
exchange for the right to sell the products as fair trade
certified. Consumers can then purchase these fair trade
labeled products, (typically more expensive than noncertified products), with the knowledge that producers
were paid above market price and were required to
uphold certain environmental and labor standards.
In 1997, most of the major fair trade organizations centralized the inspection, certification, and price
determination process by creating the independent
Fairtrade Labeling Organization International (FLO).
Only coffee bearing the “Fairtrade Certified” label has
been independently certified by FLO.   (The term Fair
Trade refers to the movement as a whole. “Fairtrade” is
a registered trademark of Fairtrade Labeling Organization
International, which certifies the vast majority of Fair
Trade coffee.)  Since the centralization of the labeling
and certification process, the demand for Fairtrade coffee
has risen dramatically. Since its introduction to North
America in 1998, the market has grown an average of
65% per year in the US alone (Ronchi, 3). According to
the International Trade forum, sales are also very strong
in Europe, growing at an average rate of 20% per year
since 2000.
This dramatic growth illustrates an increasing concern among consumers in developed countries for the
well-being of coffee producers such as Mr. Hassan in
Ethiopia. These consumers purchase fair trade coffee
with the intention of helping such farmers cope with the
hardships of the coffee crisis. This paper aims to discover
if these good intentions are translated into sustainable
relief for Mr. Hassan and the rest of the world’s coffee
growers.  
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Because Fairtrade pays producers above the market
price, some might argue that such a policy distorts the
market for coffee and decreases average coffee prices in
a given country. Basic supply and demand theory predicts a positive relationship between price and supply.
High prices increase supply by attracting new farmers
to the coffee market and encouraging existing farmers
to increase their yield. The above-market Fairtrade price
then provides an incentive to farmers to grow more coffee. This response not only perpetuates their dependence
on coffee, but results in the overproduction of coffee,
causing market prices to fall. Because the vast majority
of producers do not sell to the Fair Trade market, these
non-Fair Trade producers would have to suffer this decrease in price. Moreover, for those who do sell to the
Fair Trade market, Fairtrade sales represent only a fraction of their yield (Ronchi, 4). Their participation in the
Fairtrade market may increase the price at which they
sell one fraction of their coffee, but decrease the price
at which they sell the remaining fraction.
However, it is also possible for Fair Trade to have a
positive impact on market price. Fair Trade encourages
quality improvement among its producers. Investment
in higher quality could improve profit margins, as consumers in developed countries are clearly willing to pay
top dollar for a “premium” cup of coffee. Non-Fair Trade
producers may be encouraged to take advantage of this
premium market by their distributors. These producers
could make improvements in quality without having to
incur the costs of adopting Fair Trade labor and environmental standards. Fair Trade could encourage quality
improvements among non-Fair Trade growers in a given
country, resulting in higher market prices for coffee.
This paper will examine the following question:
How does Fair Trade presence in a given country affect
market prices paid to non-Fair Trade growers?
To test for the relationship between price and
Fairtrade, I gathered average prices paid to growers in
coffee exporting countries over the period of 1990-2006. I
controlled for supply shocks (droughts), demand shocks
(GDP of principal export market), and sticky price response (lagged price). I also included a time trend variable to control for overall market fluctuations.  
Regression results suggest a negative relationship
between equilibrium price and Fair Trade presence in a
given country. Price regression analysis predicts market
prices in countries with Fair Trade presence to be an
average of 9.50% — 17.04% lower than in countries
without Fair Trade. I also ran an export regression with
the same market shock variables. Export regressions
predict a positive Fair Trade effect on exports, which
corresponds with the theory that Fair Trade encourages
overproduction.
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Background Information:
The Coffee Market and Fair Trade
1. Coffee and Coffee Exporting Countries
As many as 70 countries are exporters of coffee. Most of
these nations are located in Latin America and Africa,
though several Asian nations also have considerable
presence in the world coffee market. These countries
produce and export the two main varieties of coffee:
Arabica and Robusta. Arabicas, mostly grown in Latin
America, typically fetch higher prices on international
markets than their Robusta counterparts (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations). Arabicas
are considered to have a more subtle taste than Robustas.
Robustas, as a the name implies, have a much more
robust flavor, which some consider to be “an inferior
tasting beverage with a higher caffeine content” (Coffee Research Institute). Africa and Asia produced the
majority of Robustas.  
The world’s coffee exporters are some of the poorest nations in the world, intensifying the considerable
humanitarian implications of a coffee crisis. Over half of
these countries had a 2006 per capita GNI of less than
$3,595, falling into the Low Income and Lower Middle
Income groups as defined by the World Bank. Only 6
coffee-exporting countries, 5 of them Latin American,
made it into the Upper Middle Income category ($3,596$11,115 per capita GNI). No major exporter of coffee is
in the highest income range of greater than $11,115 per
capita. The closest country is Mexico with a per capita
GNI of $7,870, still well below the lower bound for high
income.    
Even more telling are the figures for coffee as a
percentage of total exports. Of the four countries for
which coffee accounts for more than 15% of total exports, all four fall into very bottom of the Low Income
category for 2006, with per capita GNIs of $300 or less
(International Trade Center). Burundi, in which coffee
accounts for over half of total exports, is ranked at the
very bottom of the World Bank GNI rankings, with a
per capita GNI of $100. These developing nations are,
therefore, extremely vulnerable to price volatility in the
world coffee market. (See Figure 1)
Fair Trade is an attempt to address such price volatility. However the regression results suggest that in exchange for lower vulnerability for Fair Trade growers, the
program may, in fact, be causing increased vulnerability
for non-Fair Trade growers by lowering the equilibrium
price market price.  

only to oil in terms of overall market value for commodities (International Trade Center). By 2001, export
values plunged to a mere $4.9 billion, less than half the
pre-crisis value (International Trade Center).
The recent coffee crisis was a classic case of overproduction in which rapid expansion in supply outpaced
demand. Figure 2 and Figure 3 illustrate the particular
overproduction crisis of the coffee market. Before 1989,
the world market was rigidly regulated through a system of quotas that had existed in some form since 1963
(ICO). The beginning of the 1990s represent a period of
market adjustment when overall production and exports
fell to a decade low of around 87 million bags by the
beginning of 1995.
After declining a bit in the beginning of the decade, prices began a period of rapid growth. Such high
prices and the collapse of the quota system lured new
producers into the market, both in countries with historically high market shares of coffee production and
in countries relatively new to the coffee market. Specifically, production in Brazil, the world’s top producer,
and Vietnam increased dramatically in the mid to late
1990s. Vietnam’s market expanded so fast that by 1999
it had eclipsed Colombia as the world’s second largest
producer of coffee (Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations).
In response, prices plunged to record lows. The
very prices that had lured a multitude of thousands of
producers to the market began to fall rapidly. The market
had overcorrected as too many producers entered the
market, causing an overproduction crisis. Averages of
prices paid to coffee growers reveal an equally dramatic
decrease nearly simultaneous to the large increase in
coffee production and exports. Farmers in some of the
world’s poorest nations faced increasingly greater hardships as the crisis wore on.

2. Prices, Production, and the Coffee Crisis
The coffee market is currently in the process of recovering from a decade-long crisis that caused extreme hardship for millions of farmers worldwide. In 1997, coffee
exports were valued at an estimated $12 billion, second
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The Coffee Guide 2008
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Figure 2

International Coffee Organization 2008

Figure 3

is $1.21 per pound. Beyond the minimum price, Fairtrade
requires an additional $0.10 per pound Fairtrade premium to be allocated for use by the coffee cooperative
for various development projects. When the price of
Arabica coffee on the New York Board of Trade (NYBT)
exceeds $1.21, the Fairtrade price is then equal to the
NYBT price plus an additional $0.10 (FLO 2007).
Fairtrade is heavily concentrated in Arabica-exporting countries. Of 33 Arabica-exporting countries, 25
have at least one Fair Trade cooperative. Of those 25, 22
have had Fair Trade cooperatives operating within their
borders since 1999. Of 23 Robusta-exporting countries,
only ten have Fair Trade presence. Eight out of those ten
also export Arabica.
Arabica production is concetrated in Latin American, a region that has a long tradition of coffee cultivation. It is home to both the largest number of Fairtrade
cooperatives (199 in 2006) and the largest number of
countries that export Fairtrade coffee. Mexico has the
greatest number of cooperatives selling Fairtrade coffee,
41 total in 2006. Fairtrade cooperatives exist in 14 Latin
American countries, six of which are home to at least 15
Fairtrade cooperatives (Transfair USA 2007).
African countries were home to 32 Fairtrade cooperatives in 2006. Nearly all of these countries are in the
World Bank’s Low Income category in terms of 2006 GNI
per capita. Moreover, coffee accounts for a large fraction
of total exports for these African nations.  
Asian countries have the smallest number of
Fairtrade cooperatives. Indonesia and India have very
few cooperatives as compared to Latin American countries such as Guatemala with similar production figures.
Vietnam, the world’s second largest exporter of coffee,
has no Fairtrade presence at all.

Variables and Data Sources
International Coffee Organization 2008

3. The Characteristics and Distribution of Fair Trade
in the Coffee Market
The Fair Trade movement’s rise to prominence was
simultaneous to the dramatic collapse of world coffee
prices. The movement first took off in Europe in the late
1990s and was introduced to US markets beginning in
1998.  In 2003, Fairtrade coffee represented as much as
2.5-3% of the coffee market in Great Britain, Switzerland,
and the Netherlands. Fairtrade’s share in the US coffee
market was about 1% for the same year. However, as
the world’s largest importer of coffee with an industry
valued at $22 billion, 1% is nonetheless a considerable
amount (Transfair USA 2007). Fair Trade’s market share
continues to expand; the latest figures estimate a 3.31%
market share in the US for 2006 (Transfair USA 2007).
Fair Trade guarantees farmers a certain minimum
price for coffee. For Arabica coffee, the minimum price

58

K A L E I D O S C O P E

2 0 0 8

I pooled average price and quantity data from the International Coffee Organization historical statistics database
for 33 Arabica-exporting countries from 1990-2006. Due
to the heavy concentration of Fair Trade in Arabica-exporting countries, I chose to restrict my analysis to Arabica production only. Moreover, most Robusta-exporting
countries that are home to Fair Trade cooperatives are
also exporters of Arabica.  
The two dependent variables are average price and
average quantity. Average price is the average market
price paid to growers in each country in a given year.
Quantity is the amount exported by each country in a
given year measured in standard 60 kg bags.
As previously noted, there are two main varieties of
coffee: Arabica and Robusta. Most countries specialize in
either one or the other. There are several countries that
export a mix of both varieties (ICO). However, export
data broken down by coffee variety were not available
for periods prior to 2006. For these countries, I used ICO
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export data from 2006 and 2007 to calculate the percentage exported of each variety. I then extrapolated these
percentages to the preceding years to estimate quantities
of each variety exported over the entire time period.
Though Arabica and Robusta are priced differently,
prices for both varieties tend to fluctuate together as a
function of the coffee market as a whole. Relative prices
tend to remain fairly similar. Consequently, there is little
incentive to substitute one variety for the other when
both varieties maintain the same price relative to each
other. As a result, I concluded that export percentages
should be relatively constant over time.  
Table 1 and Table 2 present descriptive statistics
for price and quantity. Clearly, there is considerable
variation in both variables. The minimum price over
the entire time period was a rock bottom 12.9 cents per
bag in Madagascar at the height of the coffee crisis in
2001. The maximum price was $3.55, twenty-seven times
that figure, paid to  Jamaican growers in 2006. However,
Jamaican coffee is highly specialized (Coffee Research
Institute). Coffee prices in this Caribbean nation are typically two to three times the average price paid for coffee
produced in other countries. A more accurate figure is
the 1997 figure for Kenya, $1.85 per bag when coffee
prices peaked just before the coffee crisis.  
Exports exhibit an equally wide variation. Brazil is
the dominant producer in the world, producing nearly
twice as much as the second largest producer, Vietnam.
The top 20 producers excluding Brazil exported an average of 3,012,312 bags per country in 1997 when prices
reached their decade high. That figure barely budged
when prices reached record lows in 2002, when producers exported an average of 2,969,595 bags. Clearly,
supply response was quite delayed in the face of falling
prices.
The independent variables include controls for
supply shocks (droughts), demand shocks (the GDP of
the principal export) and the variable of interest, Fair
Trade.
I pooled drought data from the International Emergency Disasters Database. The severity of the drought is
measured by the estimated number of people affected by
drought annually in each country. Ideally, other sources
of supply shock, such as changing prices of fertilizers
and pesticides, would also be included. However, data
was unavailable for these types of supply shocks.
To control for demand shocks, I collected GDP data
(real US dollars (USD)) in the principal export market
for each coffee exporting country from the Penn World
Tables. I identified the principal export market based
on geography. The United States imports the bulk of
coffee produced in the Western Hemisphere. Therefore,
I designated the United States as the principal export
market for Latin American and Caribbean countries.

The exception is Cuba. Due to the American embargo,
Cuba’s principal export market is not determined by
geography. Asian countries export most of their coffee to
Japan. African countries’ main export market is Europe,
whose top three coffee importers are Germany, Italy,
and France. I combined the real GDPs for these three
countries as a measure of the principal export market
for African nations.
Fair Trade data were gathered from Fairtrade Labeling Organizations International and Transfair USA.
Unfortunately, specific yearly export data were not available for all countries with Fair Trade. Consequently, the
Fair Trade variable is a dummy variable whose value is
1 if Fair Trade was present in a given country in a given
year and 0 if Fair Trade was not present.
Table 1
Price ($0.10 USD)
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Standard Deviation
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Count

77.39
2.34
64.23
49.70
341.97
12.92
354.89
453

Madagascar 2001
Jamaica 2006

Table 2

Exports (60kg bags)
Mean
Standard Error
Median
Standard Deviation
Range
Minimum
Maximum
Count

1,757,887
163,963.5
522,490.5
3,883,547
26,749,980
3,014
26,752,994
561

Philippines 2001
Brazil 2002

Methodology
I first pooled average prices and quantities for coffee
exporting countries over the period of 1990-2006. I
chose to begin collecting data in 1990 because prior to
the nineties, members of the ICO participated in a quota
system that limited exports. Therefore, 1990 marks the
first year in which market forces began to take control
of the coffee industry.
I ran two different types of regressions to evaluate
the effect of Fair Trade on market prices paid to growers in a given country. The first type of regression is an
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Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression:

Price (Pc) is the dependent variable. Clearly, many
things could affect the market price for coffee in a given
country other than Fair Trade: weather, prices of inputs
(fertilizer/pesticides), and demand for coffee. I wished to
isolate the effect of Fair Trade on market prices, holding
all of these other factors constant. The OLS regression
does just that. The drought and export market variables
serve as “control” variables, allowing me to analyze the
effect of Fair Trade by itself.
The variables on the right side of the equation are
the independent variables discussed in the previous
section (D = drought, FT = Fair Trade, GDPEX = GDP
of main export market). The coefficients represent the
effect of a 1 unit change in the independent variable on
the dependent variable (price). If B4 = .005, then a $1
increase in the GDP in the main export market results
in a $.005 increase in the average price paid to growers.
However, as evident from Table 1, there is huge variation across countries in prices paid to growers. A $.005
increase in price in high-end Jamaican coffee is quite
different from a $.005 increase elsewhere. Consequently,
I chose to evaluate percentage changes in price rather
than absolute changes. Pc is, therefore, the log of the
average price paid to coffee growers for a given country
in a given year. The B’s then are the percentage changes
in price resulting from a 1 unit change in each corresponding independent variable.
There are several other independent variables
included in the regression, to further control for factors influencing price other than Fair Trade. Pc, t-l is the
lagged price, or the price paid to growers in the previous year. Average prices in commodities markets tend
to be fairly sticky due to market shocks. For example, a
drought causes lower yields, driving up market prices.
If a drought causes prices to be higher than average in
one period, we might expect the effects of the drought
to continue to affect prices during the next period. Even
if the drought itself has ended, coffee tree stocks might
be depleted and seed quality may have gone down.
The effects of the drought are, therefore, endured well
after the first good rain. Including the lagged price
implicitly controls for the longer term effects of such
market shocks.
The last two independent variables (TRD and TRD2)
are time trend variables. I included these variables to
control for overall market trends caused by factors that
may not be included in the regression. It is also likely
that instead of following a straight line, these market
trends may follow a more curved pattern over time.
The squared term allows me to analyze the possibility
of such a curved, parabolic pattern.

60

K A L E I D O S C O P E

2 0 0 8

OLS allows for the inclusion of “control” variables
such as drought, last year’s price, and market trends.
These factors vary both across countries and over
time. However, there are many factors that vary across
countries and do not change over time (or changes are
insignificant given the length of the time period). These
“fixed effect” factors could include any number of things:
geography, form of government, or even the cultural
importance of coffee.
Any of these “fixed effects” could cause average
prices to be lower in some countries than in others. In
these countries, farmers have more to gain by applying
for Fair Trade certification and taking advantage of the
guaranteed minimum price. Therefore, countries with
lower than average prices resulting from such a “fixed
effect” are more likely to have Fair Trade. In such a
case, this “fixed effect” is interacting with the Fair Trade
variable and distorting the estimated coefficients in the
OLS regression.
For example, in a given country, coffee may be quite
culturally important. It has been grown by generations of
farmers passing down cultivation techniques over many
years. When faced with falling prices, these farmers may
be less likely to diversify away from coffee to a more
profitable crop. This cultural inertia further aggravates
falling prices, causing average prices to be lower than
in a country in which coffee has no particular cultural
importance. Lower average prices encourage farmers to
apply for Fair Trade and receive the minimum price. This
“cultural fixed effect” is then correlated with Fair Trade,
but is not controlled for in the OLS regression. Resulting
estimated Fair Trade coefficients are therefore inflated.
A fixed effects regression solves this particular
problem. The basic fixed effects regression model is
shown below. This type of regression looks similar to
OLS, but keeps track of each specific country over time.
In doing so, the regression isolates the effects of factors
that change over time and controls for those that do
not. As a result, any fixed effect that is causing lower
than average prices will no longer distort the estimated
coefficient for Fair Trade.

I also ran several more regressions in which I
restricted the data to specific time sub-periods. Such
restrictions also allowed for a more precise fit of the time
trend variable. The first restricted regression includes
only data from 1997-2006. During this time, prices followed a fairly parabolic path. During 2000-2004, the
price trend followed an even smoother parabolic path.
However, such an approach involved a tradeoff between
the fit of the time trend and the number of observations.
Each additional restriction decreased the sample size,
perhaps causing accuracy to diminish somewhat.
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Results
1.Price
The price regressions reveal several key relationships
between average price and Fair Trade presence in a
given country. Most strikingly, there appears to be a
negative correlation between price and Fair Trade presence. Though restricting the time period does cause the
estimated coefficients to decrease in significance, the
coefficients are consistently negative in all regressions.
Additionally, it appears that price changes, rather than
structural differences, are the major force behind Fair
Trade presence in a given country.  The estimated coefficients for Fair Trade are quite similar between OLS and
fixed effects for all time periods, with the exception of
the period from 2000-2004.
Restriction of the time period as well as the inclusion of a time trend reveals that the simultaneity of a
negative price trend and the rise of Fair Trade had some
impact on the estimated percentage decrease in price.
The second regression predicts a 17.04% lower average
price in countries with Fair Trade presence as opposed to
those without. The magnitude of the estimated percentage in price difference is cut in half when the time period
is restricted to 1997-2006. Such a restriction allows for
the isolation of the crisis of the mid 1990s followed by
the current partial recovery. This pattern of price change
is clearly illustrated by the positive coefficient on the
squared time trend variable.
In addition, possible fixed effects such as form of
government and cultural importance of coffee do not
appear to be very strong. In the first three regressions,
the estimated coefficients from OLS are fairly comparable to those predicted by the fixed effects regression.
However, the fourth regression reveals an entirely different result.
I chose the time period from 2000-2004 as an additional attempt to smooth the effects of the coffee crisis
on the estimated coefficient for Fair Trade.

First of all, the estimated percentage decrease in
price resulting from Fair Trade jumps to 35.33%, nearly
twice that of the second regression (1990-2006). This
time subset represents a phase in which world coffee
prices hit their decade low. It is not surprising that a
regression that isolates the bottoming out of the market
would show such a strong negative correlation between
Fair Trade and average price.
Secondly, the fixed effects regression estimates a
price decrease of nearly three times the decrease that
is estimated by the corresponding OLS regression. For
this particular time period, it appears that possible fixed
effects are having quite a large impact on Fair Trade.
Moreover, the fraction of variance due to fixed effects in
this regression is quite high (.869) as compared to the
first three regressions.
However, it is important to consider the fact that less
dramatic price fluctuations may cause the OLS estimates
to be less precise. Additionally, accuracy may be diminished due to a smaller number of observations.
The remainder of the independent variables appear
to have fairly predictable effects on price, indicating a
good overall fit of the regression. The lagged price is
consistently positively correlated with the price at a very
high degree of statistical significance. This result is quite
logical. Market prices are typically correlated over time. If
a negative shock causes prices to be lower than average
in one period, we might expect the effects of the shock
to continue to negatively affect prices during the next
period. Similarly, the effects of a positive shock in the
previous period may continue into the current period.
The estimated coefficients for the GDP of the main
export market are all positive, though not statistically
significant in all regressions. This result is also expected.
Growth in the main export market of a given country
will likely increase the demand for the export. Increased
demand shifts the demand curve to the right and increases price.

[4] 2000-2004
[1] 1990-2006
[2] 1990-2006
[3] 1997-2006
OLS
OLS
FE
OLS
OLS
FE
FE
FE
.7387
.4393   
.6290
.3842  
.8065
-.0354
.7797
.7490   
lagged log price
   (.0367)**    (.0438)**    (.0452)** (.0590)** (.0608)** (.0756)**    (.0740)**    (.1523)**
-.0205
-.1180
-.1070
-.1030
-.0948
-.0181
-.0399
drought
-1.700
(per 100,000,000 affected)
   (.0374)**    (.0380)**    (.0409)**    (.0369)**    (.0249)**    (.0207)**    (2.970)**    (.0184)**
-.2008
-.1895
-.1003
-.0950
-.1704
-.1653
-.1217    -.3533   
fair trade
   (.0414)**    (.0580)**    (.0486)**    (.0562)**    (.0545)**    (.0705)** (.0750)** (.1325)**
.00175
-.00089 -.00013** -.00100** -.00016** .00100** .00022**
GDP main export mkt .00012
($100,000,000 USD)
   (.00008)    (.00053)    (.00008)    (.00038)    (.00008)    (.0007)    (.000010)    (.00171)
.1076
-.9848
-.8585
.0643
-.9742
-2.362
time trend
   (.0250)**    (.0237)**    (.1054)**    (.1003)**    (.3562)**    (.4292)**
-.0390
-.0420
-.0038
-.0080
-.0371
  .0893   
(time trend)2
   (.0015)**    (.0015)**    (.0044)**    (.0042)**    (.0137)** (.0168)**
Each pair of columns represents a different regression. *Indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. **Indicates statistical significance
at the 5% level.
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The surprising result is the negative coefficient for
drought. One expects a drought to cause the yield to go
down for an agricultural commodity, shifting the supply
curve to the left and increasing the equilibrium price.
This unexpected result brought into  question the regression as a whole. As a result, I ran all of the regressions
without the drought variable. However, the coefficients
and standard errors on the other independent variables
were practically identical. The coefficient is consistently
positive (and statistically significant in the first and second regressions) and appears to have no adverse effects
on the other variables. Therefore, I kept the drought
variable in the regressions.
One theory for the cause of this counterintuitive
regression coefficient stems from the idea of product
quality. Perhaps many of the droughts were not severe
enough to cause the crop to fail, but instead caused the
quality of the crop to decrease substantially. When it
came time for harvest, distributors were unwilling to
pay a high price for an inferior product.

2. Exports
As noted in the data section, the overall change for exports between 1990 and 2006 was a slow but sustained
positive trend. It seems that, faced with falling prices,
producers had difficulty responding to market signals.
The export regressions in general do not fit the data as
well as the price regressions. Many of the estimates vary
significantly across regressions in magnitude, statistical
significance, as well as sign. However, there is a clear
positive coefficient on Fair Trade in almost all of the regressions, which corresponds to the negative Fair Trade
coefficient in the price regressions.
This result is consistent with the idea that Fair Trade
provides a disincentive for coffee farmers to respond
to market fluctuations. Instead of substituting production by diversifying their crop, a guaranteed high price
encourages producers to keep producing at present
levels.  

Side by side comparisons of OLS and fixed effects
regressions provide little explanation for the relative
importance of fixed effects in determining the export
volume of a given country. In the first and third regressions, the estimated coefficient for Fair Trade decreases.
In the second and fourth regressions, the difference is
just the opposite.
For reasons of symmetry and comparison, I ran the
same series of regressions for both price and exports.
However, because producers did not respond to the
coffee crisis by drastically reducing output, trends in
average export volumes did not mirror those of average
price. Consequently, there is less need to restrict the
time period in an attempt to smooth volatility in the
dependent variable.
The fourth regression predicts some surprising effects, most notably a 51% decrease in exports due to Fair
Trade. This value is not only the opposite sign but also
more than twice the magnitude of all other estimates.
However, the overall R2 value reveals that the fourth
regression explains only 19.11% of the variation in exports. The other three regressions produced R2 values
ranging from .4230 to .9449. Additionally, as noted with
the corresponding price regression for this time period,
the dependent variable did not vary substantially during
this time period. Consequently, the signs and especially
the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients in the fourth
regression should be interpreted with caution.

Conclusions
There appears to be some evidence of market distortion
in coffee exporting countries with Fair Trade presence.
Price regressions predicted Fair Trade to have a negative
impact on average price paid to growers. Export regressions, though weaker overall, predicted Fair Trade to
have a positive impact on total exports. Together, these
results are symptomatic of a market distortion that encourages overproduction.

[4] 2000-2004
[1] 1990-2006
[2] 1990-2006
[3] 1997-2006
OLS
OLS
FE
OLS
OLS
FE
FE
FE
.8588
.1814   
.2052
.1938   
.9837
.8588
.9864    .4356  
lagged log price
   (.0321)**    (.0459)**    (.0321)** (.0422)** (.0172)** (.1183)**    (.0234)** (.2182)
-.1910
.0958
.1300
-.1300
.1620
.0018
.0111
drought
-.0082
(per 100,000,000 affected)
   (.0477)**    (.0369)**    (.0477)**    (.0537)**    (.0236)*    (.0280)    (.0309)    (.0229)
.1016
.1834
.0363
.0742
.2113
-.5171   
.1834
.0348  
fair trade
   (.0670)**    (.0650)    (.0670)**    (.0648)**    (.0570)    (.1199)
(.0076) (.0070)**
.00036
.00003    .00015 .00005**
-.00087   
GDP main export mkt .00012 -.00114**    .00035*
($100,000,000 USD)
(.00208)
   (.00008) (.00030)    (.00016)    (.00045) (.00009)    (.00090)    (.00014)
-.0477
-.0272
.5311   
-.2322
-.1150
-.0786
time trend
(.5424)
   (.4477)
   (.0062)    (.0240)*    (.1243)    (.1118)
.0039
-.0015
.0029
.0002
-.0192      .0092   
(time trend)2
   (.0033)    (.5754)    (.0054)**    (.0047)
(.0207)
(.0180)
Each pair of columns represents a different regression. *Indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. **Indicates statistical significance
at the 5% level.
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However, the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients for Fair Trade appear unrealistically large (9.5%
— 35.3% lower prices on average in countries with Fair
Trade). It seems that if Fair Trade were causing such huge
price decreases, there would be more opposition among
non-Fair Trade growers or the governments of such
countries. Part of the explanation may be the direction
of causation: a negative shock causes prices to fall and
farmers to apply for Fair Trade certification. The negative
shock encourages the entrance of Fair Trade via falling
prices. Nevertheless, one would hope that the data set
used in this paper (33 countries over 17 years) would
be large enough to eliminate such effects.
Another explanation is the limitation of the Fair
Trade to a qualitative variable due to data constraints.
Consequently, there was no measure of the amount of
Fair Trade presence in each country. In 2006, Mexico had
41 Fair Trade cooperatives, while Cameroon had only
two. These two countries were weighted equally in the
regression, perhaps causing the estimated coefficients to
be inflated. Some of this discrepancy is due to the large
difference in export volume. However, there may be
other relevant effects to identify. If data could be found
on the number of cooperatives and the total volume of
Fair Trade exports in each year, one could include some
measure of the magnitude of Fair Trade in each country
(controlling for the size of the coffee industry). Such a
modification of the Fair Trade variable would likely lead
to a more accurate estimation of the degree of influence
on equilibrium price and quantity.    
By no means does this paper provide a definitive
conclusion as to the overall value and effectiveness of
Fair Trade as a development tool. It merely suggests that
when designing and implementing a program such as
Fair Trade, it is important to take a more comprehensive
approach to evaluating overall success. It is not enough
to simply consider those who participate and benefit
directly from Fair Trade.
Furthermore, the regressions in this paper are
straightforward equilibrium price and quantity regressions. Additional considerations, such as social benefits
and effects on areas outside the coffee market, are not
included in this analysis.
More research is needed to fully measure the overall
economic and welfare implications of Fair Trade. Some
inclusion of social welfare is clearly necessary. Furthermore, there are other aspects of this recent economic
phenomenon yet to be explored. If Fair Trade producers
are paid above market price, why haven’t more producers chosen to participate? What is preventing the mass
conversion of traditional production to Fair Trade production? It would be interesting to do country-specific
analyses as well as overall market analyses to better
address these issues.

Clearly, there is a need to address the plight of
farmers who depend on coffee for the livelihood of their
families. The daily hardships endured by Mr. Hassan
in Ethiopia represent an opportunity for development
projects to alleviate his suffering along with that of coffee
farmers around the world. Fair Trade’s goal is a noble
one: directly helping farmers who are vulnerable to the
volatile coffee market. This paper reveals that the key
to lasting poverty alleviation for coffee farmers is more
complex than it appears. However, by no means is it
beyond human capability. It is likewise significant that
so many consumers in developed countries are willing
to purchase coffee with the intention of helping a farmer
halfway around the world. This raised awareness is an
encouraging first step.
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